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Abstract
Hyperproof is a computer program created by Barwise and Et-
chemendy for teaching logic using multimodal graphical and
sentential methods, inspired by their theories of heterogeneous
reasoning (Barwise and Etchemendy 1994). Elsewhere, we
have proposed a theory of the cognitive impact of assigning
information to different modalities (Stenning and Oberlander
1992). Our view is that where diagrams are advantageous, it is
becausethey enforce the representation of information, leading
to weak expressiveness, thereby facilitating inference. The pre-
sent study tests and develops these claims by comparing the ef-
fects of teaching undergraduate logic classes using Hyperproof
and a control syntactic teaching method. Results indicate that
there is significant transfer from the logic courses to logical and
analytical reasoning problems. There are also significant in-
teractions between theoretically motivated pre-course aptitude
measures and teaching method; the interactions influence post-
coursereasoning performance in transfer domains. Hyperproof
boosts students previously weak on items which benefit from
diagram use, whereas the syntactic course appears to degrade
the same group of students’ graphical strategies. As well as
being theoretically interesting, these results provide support for
the important practical conclusion that individual differences
in aptitude should be taken into account in choosing teaching
technique.
Theoretical Background
Is reasoning teachable? What is the impact of learning logic
upon general reasoning? Can graphical material be used ef-
fectively in teaching abstract subjects? These are important
pedagogical questions; the issues are also central to the de-
velopment of theory within cognitive science. In particular,
how are we to relate symbolic and heterogeneous logics to
human reasoning and learning? What is graphical represen-
tation good for and why? The present study seeks to explore
such theoretical concerns in a highly practical setting—real
logic courses.
Hyperproof (HP) is a computer program for teaching first-
order logic (FOL) which Barwise and Etchmendy (1994) de-
signed and implemented on the basis of their situation theo-
retic approach to reasoning. HP builds on an earlier program
Tarski’s World, which uses graphics to teach the syntax and
semantics of FOL; HP adds the teaching of inference by in-
corporating heterogeneous reasoning rules which move infor-
mation back and forth between graphical representations of
blocks-worldsand sentences of FOL. Computer based courses
offer a unique platform for assessing cognitive theories, since
they involve real learning over sustained periods, and permit
detailed observation of students’ reasoning processes.
Our own motivation was to extend a general theory of the
cognitive impact of assigning the same information to diffe-
rent modalities. Graphical logic teaching methods provide
a domain in which information in different modalities (sen-
tences and diagrams) can be accurately equated and where
there is a well defined task (learning and performance of rea-
soning). The theory (described in Stenning & Oberlander
1992, (submitted)) sees the distinctive property of graphical
semantics as the enforcement of the representation of certain
classes of information. This curtailment of abstraction leads
to weak expressiveness (in the logical/computational sense)
but tractable inference. The theory connects this property to
usability through relations between: the abstractions required
by tasks; the abstractions expressible in graphical systems;
and the availability of knowledge of these expressiveness pro-
perties to different classes of users. The fewer superfluous
abstractions a system expresses, the more useful it will be
for a task, but a user must be in a position to exploit these
constraints. On the other hand, if a task requires abstrac-
tions which cannot be expressed, then the system will hamper
performance.
So, the cognitive theory of graphical reasoning places a
special emphasis on the skills involved in exploiting the in-
formation enforcements which are inherent in graphical re-
presentations. HP, for example, uses various devices to over-
come graphical specificities: (a) a single diagram can contain
symbols representing objects of unknown size and unknown
shape; (b) by the use of a special part of the diagram, objects
with unknown location can also be represented; (c) arbitrary
disjunctions of information about an object (for instance, the
fact that it is either a dodecahedron or a tetrahedron) are captu-
red by multiple diagrams. Device (a) is illustrated in Figure 2.
Our approach also provides a basis for distinguishing types
of reasoning problem and so for classifying reasoning apti-
tudes. Some problems provide premisses which determine a
unique (or nearly unique) logical model, from which nume-
rous conclusions can be drawn. Other problems’ premisses do
not provide sufficent information to specify a unique model
and must be approached by isolating relevant premisses and
exploiting different inferential techniques. We call these pro-
blems determinate and indeterminate problems respectively.
They are closely related to what the graduate record exam
(GRE) analytical test calls the analytical reasoning and logi-
cal reasoning subscales respectively (Duran, Powers & Swin-
ton, 1987). Determinate (or nearly determinate) problems
lend themselves to graphical representation because repre-
sentation of a single model does not require inexpressible
Determinate problem An office manager must assign offices to six staff members. The
available offices are numbered 1–6 and are arranged in a row, separated by six foot high
dividers. Therefore sounds and smoke readily pass from one to others on either side.
Ms Braun’s work requires her to speak on the phone throughout the day. Mr White and
Mr Black often talk to one another in their work and prefer to be adjacent. Ms Green,
the senior employee, is entitled to Office 5, which has the largest window. Mr Parker
needs silence in the adjacent offices. Mr Allen, Mr White, and Mr Parker all smoke. Ms
Green is allergic to tobacco smoke and must have non-smokers adjacent. All employees
maintain silence in their offices unless stated otherwise.
  The best office for Mr White is in 1, 2, 3, 4, or 6?
  The best employee to occupy the furthest office from Mr Black would be Allen,
Braun, Green, Parker or White?
  The three smokers should be placed in offices 1, 2, & 3, or 1, 2 & 4, or 1, 2 & 6, or
2, 3, & 4, or 2, 3 & 6?
Indeterminate problem Excessive amounts of mercury in drinking water, associated
with certain types of industrial pollution, have been shown to cause Hobson’s Disease.
Island R has an economybased entirely on subsistence level agriculture with no industry
or pollution. The inhabitants of R have an unusuallyhigh incidenceof Hobsons’Disease.
Which of the following can be validly inferred from the above statements?
i. Mercury in the drinking water is actually perfectly safe.
ii. Mercury in the drinking water must have sources other than industrial pollution; or
iii. Hobson’s Disease must have causes other than mercury in the drinking water.
  (ii) only?
  (iii) only?
  (i) or (iii) but not both?
  (ii) or (iii) but not both?
Figure 1: Examples of two types of reasoning problem.
Determinate problems provide premisses which determine a
(nearly) unique logical model; indeterminate problems do not.
abstractions. GRE-type examples are illustrated in Figure 1.
Evaluating Teaching Outcomes
The evaluation was performed using a range of outcome mea-
sures. Educational computer software is rarely evaluated in
terms of effects upon learning outcomes, or with respect to ge-
neral theories of cognitive representation and process. There
have been several calls for more evaluative studies (eg Littman
and Soloway, 1988; Shute, 1990). Several computer-based
FOL teaching programs have now been developed (Goldson,
Reeves & Bornat (1992) provide a recent review); but few
have been evaluated in controlled comparisons.
The outcomes we examine here are chosen to have some
plausibility as tests of reasoning in domains beyond logic cour-
ses. We expect them to cast some light on the vexed question
of the transferrability of reasoning skills. We used GRE-type
pre- and post-tests, and ‘blocks world’ pre- and post-tests,
as detailed in section . The former involve somewhat farther
transfer than the latter, at least for the HP students. To be sure,
the problems are verbally stated; nonetheless, as can be seen
from Figure 1, they are different in both form and content
from Hyperproof problems. The GRE analytical reasoning
scale is widely recognised to be predictive of graduate school
success and so may lay some claim to be one test of ‘real
world’ reasoning skill.
Amongst teachers of logic, graphical methods remain con-
troversial. Part of the dispute may hinge on whether teaching
elementary logic is undertaken to improve general reasoning,
or to prepare students for further advanced symbolic logic
courses and their applications in, say, computer science. The
present study should therefore be viewed as investigating the
effects of the courses on cognitive processes relative to theory,
rather than deciding which approach is ‘best’. We focus on
Figure 2: The Hyperproof interface. The main windows—
graphical and calculus—are supplemented by control palettes.
The situation being viewed is the fifth in the course of the
proof, and corresponds to the fifth diamond-shaped ‘situation’
icon in the body of the proof. The graphical window contains
three symbols of varying degrees of abstraction.
effects of teaching on different problems and different groups
of students, and we concentrate on effects for performance on
problems which are external to the courses.
Method
The Hyperproof Interface
As can be seen in Figure 2, the HP interface contains two
main windows: one presents a diagrammatic view of a chess-
board world containing geometric objects of various shapes
and sizes; the other presents a listof sentences in predicate cal-
culus; control palettes are also available. The main windows
are used in the construction and editing of proofs. Several
types of goals can be proved, involving the shape, size, lo-
cation, identity or sentential descriptions of objects; in each
case, the goal can involve determining some property of an
object, or showing that a property cannot be determined from
the given information. A number of rules are available for
proof construction; some of these are traditional syntactic ru-
les (such as -elimination); others are ‘graphical’, in the sense
that they involve consulting or altering the situation depicted
in the diagrammatic window. In addition, a number of rules
check properties of a developing proof. HP should be viewed
as a proof-checking environment designed to support human
theorem proving using heterogeneous information.
Subjects
The subjects were 35 first-year Stanford undergraduates atten-
ding courses on introductory logic. Two groups were compa-
red. Group 1 attended a course taught using HP (22 subjects).
A second group (13 subjects) attended a course taught syntac-
tically. The HP class was taught in the Fall quarter of 1992
and the Syntactic class was held in the Spring quarter of 1993.
While it was not possible to to randomly assign students to
the two courses, the students were unaware of any differen-
ces in the courses prior to enrolment, and are drawn from the
same general population of undergraduates required to take
an elementary logic course.
Teaching
Hyperproof Group The course consisted of a 12 week (one
quarter) course on first-order logic. The HP class were taught
using HP plus HP curriculum material (Barwise and Etche-
mendy, 1994). The course included 72 computer-based exer-
cises covering the use of HP graphical rules and, to a limited
extent, the use of syntactic rules in the development of proofs.
Eight of 30 students (27%) dropped out of the HP class before
completing the course.
Syntactic Group The syntactic class was taught a course of
the same duration as the HP group. The syntactic course was
based around a standard, traditional (ie syntactically oriented)
instructional text (Bergman, Moor and Nelson, 1990). In
order to control for the motivational effects of computer use
and other factors, the syntactic group also used HP. However
their version had its graphics window disabled (with an empty
chessboard). The ‘syntactic’ students used only the syntactic
rules of HP and worked exclusively in the sentence window.
Twenty three of their computer-based exercises were adapted
from their coursebook;a further 54 exercises in the use of HP’s
sentential rules were taken from the HP resource book. Thus
there were 77 HP-based exercises in total for this group. Nine
of 22 students (41%) dropped out of the syntactic class before
completing the course. The level of attrition was therefore
higher than the HP group’s. In both cases, the drop-out rate is
attributable at least in part to the general practice of signing
on for more courses than will ultimately be taken.
Pre and post teaching tests
The object was to provide tests of reasoning skill which were
sufficiently independent of course content to be administrable
before the course, and which would provide some test of
transfer to reasoning beyond the course material. Two tests
were developed which we will refer to as the blocks-world test
and the GRE test. The blocks-world problems are slightly
‘nearer’ transfer tests (at least for the HP course) than the
GRE tests, but even they are more closely related to real-
world reasoning than typical intra-course exam items from a
logic course. Both classes were administered the same battery
of paper and pencil tests before and after the course.
The blocks world tests were based on HP graphics but cou-
ched in natural language. Their items consist of a diagram
of an arrangment of blocks on a checkerboard, and some sta-
tements constraining assignments of names to blocks. Que-
stions were about what is provable or not provable from this
information, or specified modifications of it. These tests are
further described in Cox and Oberlander (1993).
The second outcome test consisted of pseudo graduate re-
cord examination (GRE) analytical reasoning test items (sel-
ected from a crammer for the test), and divided into two
sub-scales: logical reasoning (argument analysis) and analy-
tical reasoning. We observe that these two subscales of the
GRE analytical reasoning test align closely with our theory’s
distinction between determinate and indeterminate problems
which are either suitable or unsuitable for graphical reaso-
ning methods. Empirical psychometric results (eg: Duran,
Powers & Swinton, 1987) have supported this distinction; it
reinforces our proposal that this is an important dimension for
categorising reasoning problems. It also suggests that indivi-
dual differences in cognitive style may be important factors
in applying the theory to empirical data.
Parallel forms of each test were used on pre- and post-
course tests. Suitable tests with population norms were not
available and this means that absolute comparisons between
pre- and post-test scores must be interpreted with caution.
However, most of the interesting comparisons are between
groups of students and between subscales but within post-
test scores, and so relative changes in performance are the
focus. These relative changes can be assessed as long as these
points are born in mind. Of the 22 Hyperproof subjects, 16
completed both the paper and pencil pre- and post-course tests,
and all 22 completed the post-course computer-based exam.
The 13 syntactic students completed the pencil and paper pre-
and post-tests, but 11 completed the syntactic computer-based
exam.
Results
Blocks world test results
In order to examine the effects of training modality upon
cognitive style differences, subjects were classified as DetHi
or DetLo on the basis of scores on the analytical subscale of
the GRE-based test. The former scored well on analytical
reasoning items; the latter scored less well. The resulting
‘level of determinacy’ (DetHi/Lo) factor was entered as an
additional factor in the analysis of the ‘blocks world’ test
data.
A 3 factor ANOVA (groups by DetHi/Lo by time) was
performed on the ‘blocks world’ test results. The first factor
was groups, the second (DetHi/DetLo) was nested under the
first, and the third (time) was a repeated measure. Figure 3
shows the means for DetHi and DetLo scorers in the 2 groups.
The ANOVA revealed that the main effect for group was
significant (F     MSe   p  ). The
main effect for DetHi/Lo was also significant (F    
	MSe   p  ). As shown in Figure 3, the
DetHi subjects tend to score higher than the DetLo subjects.
The 3-way interaction (group by DetHi/Lo by time) was
also significant (F     
MSe   p  ).
Thus the experience of learning logic graphically had dif-
ferent effects upon DetHi and DetLo scorers within the HP
group. DetHi subjects’ scores did not differ from those of their
DetLo colleagues on the pre-training test, but following the
HP course they scored significantly higher than their DetLo
counterparts. Conversely, DetHi scorers in the syntactic group
significantly (according to a post-hoc comparison) decrea-
sed in their blocks world test performance compared to their
DetLo counterparts.
A post-hoc comparison showed that DetLo subjects in the
syntactic group scored significantly lower than their DetHi
counterparts on the blocks world pre-training test. The reasons
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Figure 3: Mean score on Blocks World test as a function of
subjects’ performance on analytical reasoning GRE subscale
(DetHi/Lo) by Group (HP/Syn) by Time (Pre/Post)
for this result are unclear, but may be due to selection biases.
GRE-based analytical test results
Subscale scores on the analytical reasoning test were subjected
to a 2 factor (groups by time) ANOVA with repeated measures
on the second factor. There were two levels of each factor.
Logical reasoning subscale scores No main effects were
significant. However the group by time interaction was sig-
nificant (F   	  
MSe   p  ) shown
in Figure 4a. On the verbal reasoning items, the syntac-
tic group improved significantly more than the HP students.
This suggests that the experience of being taught first-order
logic syntactically generalises to other kinds of linguistic rea-
soning: from reasoning about proofs in a formal language
(first-order logic) to reasoning in natural language.
Analytical reasoning subscale scores Both groups im-
proved significantly in terms of their scores on this subs-
cale. The main effect for time was significant (F   	 
		MSe  
 p  ). The main effect for groups
and the group by time interaction were not significant (Fi-
gure 4b). In this case HP did improve the measure more than
the syntactic class, but not significantly so.
Discussion
Both HP and syntactic courses were effective in teaching rea-
soning which transferred to other domains. This is, in itself,
significant, since the existence of such transfer effects has
been disputed (cf. Nickerson, Perkins & Smith, 1985, for a
discussion). The results do not indicate that either course is a
globally better way of teaching. The most prominent effects
are interactions between student aptitudes, types of problem,
and teaching methods.
For students who are able at determinate problems, a syntac-
tic logic course actually decreases their scores on blocks world
problems. Their colleagues on the same course who start out
less able at determinate problems actually improve slightly,
so the two groups are indistinguishable at course-end. Tea-
ching students who are able at determinate problems a HP
course increases their ability at blocks-world problems. Their
colleagues on the same course who start out less able at de-
terminate problems actually decline slightly in blocks world
reasoning and finish indistinguishable on this measure from
the syntactically taught subjects. This pattern of results sup-
ports the idea that syntactic teaching may actually interfere
with ‘model-construction’ reasoning modes which are im-
portant outside logic courses. HP appears to enhance the
performance of students who are already able at this sort of
reasoning but does not yet help the students who are initially
weaker. It will be important to characterise in process terms
what these differences are and seek remedies.
GRE test performance presents a slightly different picture.
Though both courses improve performance on both subscales
of the GRE post-test, syntactic teaching increased GRE verbal
subscale scores significantly more than HP teaching, whereas
the two courses were not significantly different in their effect
on the diagrammatic subscale scores. The greater indeter-
minate problem improvement of syntactic teaching might be
expected, but syntactic teaching also improves determinate
problem performance.
We are currently analysing students’ ‘work scratchings’ on
the GRE problems in terms of Cox and Brna’s (1993) 7 ca-
tegories, which include tables, map/plans, and so on. We
can compare the representations used by students with those
recommended by the ‘crammer’ from which the test item was
derived (Brownstein, Weiner & Weiner Green, 1990; Educa-
tional Testing Service, 1992). These results have a pattern
similar to that in the blocks-world tests. Strong determinate
problem solvers (DetHi) appear to retain their effective strate-
gies through either type of course. But weak determinate pro-
blem solvers (DetLo) respond oppositely to the two courses.
The HP course moves these student’s strategies significantly
in the direction of the recommended methods of GRE pro-
blem solution (and the strategies of their DetHi peers). The
syntactic course actually moves DetLo students significantly
away from the recommended strategies, but without neces-
sarily making them worse reasoners. A finer interpretation
of these results awaits an analysis of the detailed methods of
reasoning among these groups.
Thus blocks-world and GRE analytical reasoning subscale
performance react somewhat differently to the two teaching
methods. The two types of reasoning problem, though both
based on determinate models, differ in several ways. The
blocks world problem requires the application of information
from a set of sentential constraints to a presented diagram. A
GRE analytical reasoning problem requires the construction
of a determinate model (often represented in a self-constructed
diagram or table) from a set of sentential constraints. It would
be possible to transpose such GRE problems into HP and to
include them in our pre- and post-tests to assess whether this
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Figure 4: Hyperproof and Syntactic groups’ mean scores on GRE subscales: (a) logical (argument analysis) (b) analytical
is a possible explanation of the blocks-world GRE discrepan-
cies. Whether graphics are constructed by subjects or merely
presented to them has been shown to be determining factor in
their efficacy (Grossen & Carnine, 1990).
This difference in direction of movement of information
may be related to some of the proof-style differences observed
in HP use. DetHi and DetLo subjects seem to use graphical
abstraction symbols in differing parts of the proof structure
(cf. Oberlander, Cox and Stenning, 1994). DetHi subjects
tend to exploit such symbols more extensively during the
course of developing proofs. This appears to lead to more
systematic and structured proof by cases, with deeper and
more frequent use of nested structures. We are currently
analysing these differences in the styles of final proofs, and
we hope in due course to extend these analyses to examine
the very rich HP logfile data, which reveal the time course of
proof construction.
This tension in the results underlines an important potential
contribution of basing a cognitive theory on computational
properties of representations rather than on intuitively groun-
ded concepts such as ‘visual’ and ‘verbal’ thinking. We expect
further modelling of proof style to make a contribution to a
cognitive characterisation of just what it is computationally to
be a ‘verbal’ or ‘visual’ thinker.
These results suggest a number of possible improvements
in the way that HP could be used in teaching. Perhaps the main
conclusion of the present study is that those developments are
almost certainly going to have to be sensitive to the pre-course
aptitudes of different students. However, it is encouraging
that at least some important aptitudes can be diagnosed very
simply and could be built into student models within the HP
environment.
The educational implications of these individual differences
are far from clear. Should all students be taught to use graphi-
cal reasoning methods or should students be encouraged to fol-
low their existing representational modality preferences? The
second position suggests that instruction should be adapted
to the (relatively immutable?) cognitive style of the learner.
This is the approach advocated by Snow (eg Snow, Federico
& Montague, 1980) based on studies of Aptitude-Treatment
Interactions. It remains to be demonstrated, however, that the
‘visualiser—verbaliser’ dimension is unresponsive to educa-
tional intervention. Perhaps a domain-independent ‘graphics
curriculum’ should be devised and generally taught? The aut-
hors tend towards the view that students should be encouraged
to broaden their representational repertoires. We agree with
Barwise (1993) that “efficient reasoning is inescapably hete-
rogeneous (or ‘hybrid’) in nature” [p1]. We strongly disagree
with those such as Dijsktra (1989, cited by Myers, 1990) who
has described the use of graphical visualizations in teaching
computer programming as “an obvious case of curriculum
infantilization”.
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